This article juxtaposes Marx's critique of capitalism with recent developments in affect theory. My central argument is that a critique of the tension of capitalist affect is fundamental to a Marxian account of capital: on the one hand, capitalism ampli es the potential affective capacity of bodies through its development and organization of productive forces; on the other, it captures this increase to enrich the bourgeoisie, immiserate the proletariat, and reproduce capitalism. I also sketch the ways that an affective interpretation can provide insight into anticapitalism resistance and post-capitalist life within Marx's theoretical and philosophical project. Ultimately, reading Marx's critique of capitalism for its resonances with Deleuzean-Spinozan affect theory not only generates a newfound apprehension of the affective register of that critique, but also adds to the critical repertoire of affect theory.
". . . [E] xperience shows to the intelligent observer how rapidly and rmly capitalist production has seized the vital forces of the people at their very roots. "
Introduction: Reading Marx Affectively
Given the centrality of Marx to cultural studies and the prominence of affect theories in recent cultural studies -not to mention work that brings together Marxism and the study of affect and feeling -it is imperative to consider more directly the resonances between Marx's work and affect theory itself. This article argues for reading Marx I explore these questions and more by juxtaposing Marx with a mode of affect theory emerging from the work of Baruch Spinoza and Gilles Deleuze, in order to claim Marx as a proto-affect theorist analyzing the capacities of bodies for affecting and being affected in a way that anticipates-and thus offers generative potential contributions for-cultural studies and other endeavors currently engaged with questions of affect. My central argument is that a critique of the tension of capitalist affect is fundamental to a Marxian account of capital: on the one hand, capitalism ampli es the potential affective capacity of bodies through its development and organization of productive forces; on the other, it captures this increase in affective capacity to enrich the bourgeoisie, immiserate the proletariat, and reproduce capitalism. That is, I contend that for Marx (once read through Spinoza and Deleuze), capitalism produces not only particular relations, ideologies, subjects, and so on, but also produces an intensi cation and then appropriation of affective capacity. Kathi Weeks, in her generative book on post-and anti-work imaginaries, insists that we pay attention to the capitalist domination of the worker in terms of more than just a "quantitative" logic of exploitation; instead, domination must also "be grasped in qualitative terms, as attitude, affect, feeling, and symbolic exchange. " This article takes on this task through a return to Marx himself, deploying affect theory to think through Marx's theoretical project in a way that focuses on affective relations of domination. I also put into practice Jean-François Lyotard's enthusiastic declaration that "we must come to take Marx Marx entails. I take a cue from Sara Ahmed's motivating gesture in The Cultural Politics of Emotion, in the way she insists we ask the question "'what do emotions do, '" because rather than thinking of "emotion as being 'in' texts" that we can go nd or not nd in some way, the "emotionality of texts" consists in "how texts are 'moving' , or how they generate Eve Kosofky Sedgwick's introduction to Touching Feeling presents an additional impetus at the level of reading practices in her argument for reading "beside" as a way of doing theoretically informed textual interpretation. Reading "beside" facilitates the interaction of multiple potentially-heterogeneous elements in a way that eschews "linear logics, " "dualistic thinking, " the "hermeneutics of suspicion, " and the "fantasy of metonymically egalitarian relations . . . between texts and concepts. " As such, my reading seeks to put Finally, I take these catalysts for my own reading and interpretive practices and put them in practice with Lauren Berlant's discussion of affect, "cultural Marxism, " and the historical novel. For her, a cultural Marxist analysis engages the historical novel as putting forth "a locus of affective situations that . . . exemplify political and subjective formations, " where affect becomes "the very material of historical embeddedness, " all opening the possibility for an "affectivity of the historical present relayed by an aesthetic transmission. " It thus works as "the aesthetic expression of an affective epistemology" and can "point to a converging unity of experience in an ongoing moment that could later be called epochal but that at the time marked a shared nervous system that it was the novelist's project to put out there for readers. " I suggest that we read Marx himself as, if not as the novelist expressing the aesthetics of epochal affective experience and epistemology, then as the theorist expressing the laws of motion of epochal capitalist affective experience and structures. In my reading below, he theorizes the affective situation exemplifying the capitalist formation that saturates the experiences of laboring subjects in a particular sort of account of the shared nervous system of capitalist affect. It is not only Raymond 
Marx, Affect Theory, and Materialism
In this essay, I work with a Spinozan-Deleuzean trajectory of affect theory. In Deleuze's rendering, Spinoza theorizes bodies in terms of capacity to affect and to be affected (Spinoza's affectus), such that bodies interact in encounters that can increase or decrease this capacity (this change in capacity is Spinoza's affectio). For Deleuze and Felix Guattari, these Spinozan concepts give rise to a de nition of the body as "the sum total of the material elements belonging to it under given relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness" and "the sum total of the intensive affects it is capable of at a given power or degree of potential. " Deleuze describes how for Spinoza the "individual" is: rst of all a singular essence, which is to say, a degree of power. A characteristic relation corresponds to this essence, and a certain capacity for being affected corresponds to this degree of power. [ . . . ] Thus, animals are de ned less by the abstract notions of genus and species than by a capacity for being affected, by the affections for which they are 'capable, ' by the excitations to which they react within the limits of their capacity.
That is, for Deleuze's Spinoza, we must de ne individuals by their characteristic relations and essential power. As such, "all power [potentia] is inseparable from a capacity for being affected. " In a more recent elaboration of this mode of affect theory, Patricia T. Clough conceptualizes affect as "pre-individual bodily forces augmenting or diminishing a body's capacity to act. " This is always a relational notion, for one's capacity to affect and be affected and own affections of which they are capable shape the potential kinds of compositions of bodies and things that may be possible. Consequently, the effects of any composition of individual(s) and object(s) are constituted by the affective capacities of those individuals and objects. A Deleuzean-Spinozan affect theory approaches these kinds of interactions similarly: things "act differently according to the objects encountered" and respond by way of "the affections that come from the objects. " It is this general Deleuzean-Spinozan notion, the capacities of bodies to affect and be affected, 
Marx's Affect Theory of Labor
The material conditions in which the body is enmeshed limit its essential powers, and the body-as-affective-capacity does not exist in the same con guration transhistorically, but instead varies in its capacities as well as its expressions and relations of that capacity in response to changing material conditions. The powers of different kinds of bodies in a feudalist social formation will differ from those bodies under capitalism, and both will vary in relation to communist bodies, while the gendering, racialization, sexing, and colonizing of bodies shapes their vital capacities and the way the social and cultural worlds take up those capacities. A Deleuzean-Spinozan reading of Marx directs us to examining the particular con guration and relations of affective capacity of bodies in different epochs, and of course in capitalism most prominently.
When we read Marx affectively, the reach of his critique of capitalism expands. I argue that an affective reading of Marx should lead us to consider a feature of his project beyond our conventional understanding of his critique of alienation, the appropriation of surplus labor, oppressive factory conditions, and so on. In my reading, not only does Marx condemn capitalism for the alienation and exploitation it engenders, but he also identi es and critiques what I will call the tension of capitalist affect. My contention emerges from a close reading, incited by Spinoza and Deleuze, of the linked recurring concepts of living labour, labor power, living labor capacity, vitality/vital forces, and capacity more broadly, primarily as Marx mobilizes them in the Grundrisse and the rst volume of Capital. This cluster of related terms expresses a creative, productive force, and I argue that Marx's account of labor and capitalism can be read as an account of affective capacity. In this register, concepts such as living labor capacity or vital forces become capacities to affect (to create, to give form, to valorize, to give power to, to transfer capacity, to actualize in the produced object, and so on) and to be affected (to enter into relations with the product of labor, with other laborers, with the process of production, and to be changed by these relations). Deleuze's Spinoza seeks to de ne an individual not in terms of a static classi cation scheme, but by "the affects of which it is capable, " its "affective capacity, " the "capacities for affecting and being affected. " When we situate this conception on the same plane with Marx's account, I argue we open the way to read the laboring body-in its 35 36 37 38 living labor capacity and vital forces, especially in the interaction of these capacities with other bodies, with capitalist social formations, and so on-as an affective body, and thus enliven Marx's critique of capitalism.
My approach resonates with Catherine Chaput's affective reading of Marx, where she mobilizes a concept of the transmission of affect in relation to Marx's theory of value in order to examine reality television. I also make a similar move to that of May, who works with Spinozan affect to theorize labor power as "an anonymous aggregate of capacities activated in the process of the production of use-values, " although I present a sustained account of this in terms of Marx's critique of capital, where May turns to think about labor power as a "surplus" that can underpin class struggle. Finally, I seek to rearticulate the project posed by Marxist feminist Rosemary Hennessy, but in the affective domain.
Hennessy contends that we must follow the "relationships of exploitation, domination, and acquisitiveness" as the "kernel" of capital through the ways it "imposes its logic at every 'level' of society. " My own reading of Marx's critique explores how these relations impose themselves at the affective level of society. generatively "reconceptualize labor power in relation to affectivity"; it is possible and important that an affective reading of Marx can create a similar rethinking such that labor power in Marx's texts themselves works in the affective register.
Marx regularly depicts labor power in an abstract sense in terms of bodily capacity. In a general relation to capital, "labour is the merely abstract form . . . which exists only as a capacity, as a resource in the bodiliness of the worker. " Labor power that is "present in time" in a form that will "form the opposite pole to capital" is "value-creating, productive labour" and "can be present only in the living subject, in which it exists as capacity, as possibility. " That which encounters capital becomes a capacity emanating from the body. Labor-as-capacity situates Marx on a plane with Spinoza's Deleuze. Marx does not de ne labor or the laboring body in terms of some static essence or inert property; labor is a dynamic, generative potentiality. What does this labor capacity do? It moves, creates, actualizes, affects, and is affected. When it comes into "contact with capital" as well as means and relations of production, it is "made into a real activity" and "becomes a really value-positing, productive activity. " Labor capacity acts: it is the subjective "activity . . . as the living source of value" and "general possibility of wealth. "
Labor capacity ows through bodies and relations as a potential power and interacts with other materialities. It is transformed by these interactions, turned as it is into real productive labor and depleted through the activity of laboring. This capacity also transforms those materials through its creative, value-giving power. We can read labor as production process. In "being employed, " labor transforms the "raw material" of production by being "materialized" as a "modi cation of the object" that also "modi es its own form. " Here, labor capacity in its actualization affects the material and the labor process. Living labor is also affected by the raw material and by the laboring process.
Once "set into motion, " labour capacity is "expended" in the form of "the worker's muscular force etc. " such that the worker "exhausts himself. " In this instance labor capacity is used up in its encounter with material and labour process, and the body it ows through becomes tired and needful of replenishment. That is to say, it affects and is affected, with its powers and capacities constantly recon gured and reshaped due to its life in a capitalist formation.
The Critique of Capitalist Affect
Once we read Marx in terms of Deleuzean-Spinozan affect and theorize the body and labor capacity in terms of affective capacity, we articulate new zones of Marx's critique of capitalism. On the one hand, capitalism ampli es the potential affective capacityunderstood as the capacity to affect and be affected-of bodies and things through its development and organization of productive forces; on the other, capitalism transforms this increase in productive forces so that it enriches the bourgeoisie while immiserating the proletariat and reproducing capitalism. The ampli ed force of the laboring body and of the machine is productive, and it affects and is affected by other bodies and machines. The affective capacity in one social system will differ from that of another epoch. The social formation of capital, in its "universalizing tendency, " "strives towards the universal development of the forces of production. " In my reading, it seeks to organize bodies and materials such that productive capacity can be maximized: capitalism aims at, and to some extent enacts, a mass ampli cation of the capacity to affect and be affected. 
which hem in the development of . . . exploitation and exchange of natural and mental forces. " Capitalism needs labor to be more ef cient-to affect and be affected at an ever-increasing rate-if it is to extract more surplus labor and thus reproduce and expand. It needs the creative power of labor capacity to be directed at the creation of goods for capitalist circulation. It requires situating many workers and their capacities together in the same spatial and temporal site to overcome the limits of the working day.
Generally, capital "is productive" as "an essential relation for the development of the social productive forces" and it "incessantly whips onward with its unlimited mania" the "development of the productive powers of labour. " Capitalism does not only produce particular social and economic relations, or particular forms of ideology, or speci c types of worker-subjects, but also directly produces an intensi cation of affective capacity.
The very "concept of capital" contains "the concentration of many living labour capacities. " Viewed as a general society-wide formation, it demands an ampli cation of these forces directed to its own reproduction and expansion. Capital does more than this, however; it also comes to posit itself as the exclusive agent conducting this power. In doing so it conceals the actual bodies generating and actualizing these forces as well as the effects on these bodies of capitalist processes. All the "social powers of production are productive powers of capital, " and the "collective power of labour" becomes "the collective power of capital. " Capitalist processes collectivize and increase affective capacity in a particular mode of production, then put it to work for the bene t of capitalists and the extension of capitalism, but in a way such that capitalism itself appears as the bearer of this power. The individual body realizes the capacity of living labor, but capitalism seizes this force as its own. By placing a mass of workers in the same location and compelling them to work toward the same end and in the same production process, "capital appears as the collective force of the workers, their social force, as well as that which ties them together, and hence as the unity which creates this force. " In the process of amplifying affective capacity, capital comes to posit itself as the vehicle for and unifying energy behind this collective force. Doing this renders the actual forces themselves-those of laboring bodies-invisible in an affective form of fetishism. By standing in as the representation and unity of concentrated forces that in in reality results from an actualization of labor capacities in the form of exploited, alienated laboring bodies, capitalism conceals the fact that the ampli cation of overall or total capacity it engenders also directly enervates and destroys the very bodies from which this affective capacity was extracted and realized for pro t and further growth.
Upon this reading, alienation in Marx's works takes on a particularly affective character, as a force that confronts and opposes the laborer: capitalism alienates the worker from their material affective capacity, then opposes a warped affective force against the worker. As a result of the division of labor, a laborer's "own deed"-read: actualization of affective capacity-"becomes an alien power opposed to him"; the combined efforts of laborers comprise a "social power" that "appears to these individual[s] … not as their own united power, but as alien force existing outside them" that becomes "the prime governor" of human "will and action. " The language used by Marx in the 1844 Manuscripts consistently depicts alienation in terms of external force, marking it as "an alien object exercising power, " in terms of the "product of labor;" an "alien activity not belonging to" the worker when it comes to the "act of production;" and a "being alien to him" when discussing species-being. Similar formulations persist in the later Marx: for example, in the Grundrisse, the "product of labour . . . endowed by living labour" becomes "an alien property" and "labour in general . . . comes to confront the worker as an alien power. " This external force confronts the worker and drains them of affective capacity. Alienated labor is "external to the worker" in a way that, instead of "develop[ing] freely his physical and mental energy, " "morti es his body. " Alienation thus describes in some ways the embodied experience of the worker in capitalism subject to the seizure or redirection of their affective capacity. Not only do social relations and productive processes capture the ability to act and be acted upon, this process on a mass scale poses an affective force against the worker that enervates their own capacity. As Sara Ahmed notes, alienation in Marx is both alienation vis-à-vis labor in "a kind of self-estrangement" and is "a feeling-structure, a form of suffering that shapes how the worker inhabits the world" given that "the world they have created is an extension of themselves . . . that is appropriated. For Marx, the "collisions" between individuals "produce an alien power standing above them, " a "process and power independent of them. " The worker puts their life-their dynamic mattering, material productive force-into labor, but this results in confrontation with an alien force. Living labour capacity becomes separated from "its own labour, " "alien to it"; as a result, it "has become poorer by the life forces expended" and transferred to the alien product, process, and force. Alienated labor means that instead of the laboring body realizing its capacity or power, labor wrests and appropriates this affective force in a way that both lessens the capacity of that body and poses as a warped, confrontational alien power against it. The "social relation of individuals to one another" has become, in a perversion of the potentiality and relational connectivity of affective force, a "power over the individuals which has become autonomous" of them. Marx's account of alienation, like his broader critique of capitalism, centrally engages and works through the dynamics of affect. In the "production process of capital, " labor "appears just as subservient to and led by an alien will and an alien intelligence" in the form of an "animated monster. " This alien(ation) monster, like the capital-as-vampire gure below, feeds on affective capacity.
It is in these many senses of capitalist affect that, as marked in the epigraph from Capital that opens this article, "capitalist production" has "rapidly and rmly…seized the vital forces of the people at their very roots. " When Marx makes this claim, we should read it affectively. Vital forces are not (or at least not only) metaphorical, nor does the statement refer exclusively to the way capitalism oppresses the proletariat (although it certainly does that). Capitalism captures the essential powers of individual bodies, their capacity to affect and be affected; it is the usurpation of creative, generative, affective force. It makes labor capacity a force for capital alone. We might thus say that one de ning characteristic of the proletariat as a class is its particular mode of enmeshment in these capitalist affective ows. That is, one component of the class status or process of the proletariat is that one's affective capacities are ampli ed, but this power is captured for the reproduction of capital and enrichment of another affective class at the expense of one's own body. The worker becomes "nothing other than labour-power for the duration of forces"; capital "realizes itself through the appropriation of alien" living labour capacity.
It depends on this affective capture for its own perpetuation. Consequently, "every increase in the powers of social production . . . the productive power of labour itself"-and as I have discussed, this increase is something required and continually produced by capitalism-"enriches not the worker but rather capital; hence it only magni es again the power dominating over labour; increases only the productive power of capital. " Cheah, Sean Grattan argues that much of Spinozist Marxism-especially that of Negri, writing with and without Hardt-effaces the way that affect is not only joyful encounters or increases in the power to act; Spinoza also carefully theorizes the ways that encounters may be and often are harmful and diminishing of the power to act. The problem is that avoiding the possibility of harmful or sad encounters, or erasing them from one's theory, as Grattan asserts Spinozist Marxism too often does, cannot in fact rid the world of sad affects and harmful encounters. Instead, because they are part of existence, "coming to terms with potential causes of sad affects is crucial to critical practice. This is one of the reasons that I nd it so necessary to go back to Marx himself in relation to affect and to Spinoza. As I have demonstrated, Marx is perhaps the most incisive critical analyst of the material practices, relations, and conditions that organize life as a series of sad affects and harmful encounters. Ruddick notes that the turn to Spinoza in critical theory has "invigorated a radical ethico-politics of ontology, " one "embracing . . . an indwelling, vital, and immanent concept of power as potentia" that is "set against a parasitic capitalism. " My reading of Marx also works through some of the tensions between more structural and more affective modes of cultural, political, and social theories, more speci cally about the possibility of affect theory being part of structural or quasi-structural analysis. My argument is, in many ways, a structural one, following Marx: capitalism systematically organizes, ampli es, and captures affect, in a way that maps onto Marx's structural theorizing about class positions within capitalism. This is tension with affect theory, for example in the way that Massumi counterposes "cultural theory" focuses on "structure"-in which he claims "nothing ever happens" and "all eventual permutations are pre gured via self-consistent generative rules"-to affect as a "collapse of structured distinction into intensity, of rules into paradox. " In this sense, bringing together affect theory and a structural understanding of Marx becomes quite complicated. tensions remain inextricable. Massumi notes that while "affect is indeed unformed and unstructured . . . it is nevertheless highly organized and effectively analyzable. " I understand my reading of Marx to be a quasi-structural analysis of the organization of affect under capitalism at a very general level. Even though affect always exceeds any attempts at containing it, this should not preclude attempts to theorize large-scale political, social, and economic patternings of affective ows. Massumi closes the chapter I have been quoting in this section by claiming that affect has the "ability . . . to produce an economic effect more swiftly than economics itself" and is thus "a real condition, an intrinsic variable of the late capitalist system, as infrastructural as a factory"; affect is maybe even "beyond infrastructural, it is everywhere, in effect. " I would argue that affectively returning to Marx provides one important route for taking on the task of analyzing affect as infrastructural to capitalism and a real condition of economic existence. In this sense, this is an analogous approach to that of Williams with his concept of a structure of feeling, as he too works to provide a structural analysis of bodily experience. If I am right that Marx is theorizing capitalism as a social formation that ampli es affective capacities, but at the same times captures it from those actualizing such potentials, then affect is indeed "everywhere, in effect, " to use Massumi's phrase. At the same time, I argue that my reading also responds to the critique that work bringing philosophical concepts about materialism into Marx has been unable to understand systemic processes and social totalities. Instead, I nd affect theory to be a crucial tool for making legible large-scale processes that are constitutive of capitalism, even if elements of affect theory push against the structural dimensions of that analysis.
Ultimately, capitalism produces a "throng of people . . . made up of generations of stunted, short-lived and rapidly replaced human beings, plucked, so to speak, before they were ripe. " In its ongoing need to absorb and put to use labor capacity, capitalist production quickly uses up the forces of the body themselves, "shortening the life of labour-power, in the same way as a greedy farmer snatches more produce from the soil by robbing it of its fertility. " Capitalism requires the ampli cation of affective capacity, but in realizing this necessity it depletes the source from which it seizes that capacity in the rst place. Marx intensely describes this depletion of forces and bodies: capitalism "oversteps . . . the merely physical limits of the working day, " granting only "the exact amount of torpor essential to the revival of an absolutely exhausted organism" and leaving only "diseased, compulsory and painful" labour-power, "produc[ing] the premature exhaustion and death of this labour-power itself. " Perhaps when Marx writes about the "vampire-like" quality of capital, the way it "lives only by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more labour it sucks, " we ought to think of capital as the affect vampire, sucking the capacity, force, and power from the depleted bodies it leaves behind.
Toward Communal Affect
Of course, for Marx, Capital "possesses" this "tendency" towards the "free, unobstructed, progressive, and universal development" of productive force, but "since capital is a limited form of production, " this tendency "contradicts it and hence drives it towards dissolution. " Capitalism initiates a movement of capacities and powers in the direction of their universal development, which would in turn generate real freedom. However, it seeks to halt this movement, appropriating these intensi ed forces and destroying the bodies realizing them. This, Marx argues, proves impossible; once unleashed, these affective capacities will work towards their own realization in free conditions, potential, " the "openness of bodily matter to its own unstable, pre-individual capacities" such that affect works as "potentiality, indeterminate emergence, and creative mutation. " If capitalism "produces, above all, its own grave-diggers" then its death is in part affective, and the grave-diggers include the renewed communist force of proletarian affective capacity. When we surpass "the limited bourgeois form, " we nd-in a passage that would be just as at home in Spinoza, or in Deleuze and Guattari-the "universality of individual needs, capacities, pleasures, productive forces, " the "absolute working-out of" the "creative potentialities" of human bodies, the "development of all human powers as such the end in itself, " and the individual who "strives not to remain something he has become, but is in the absolute movement of becoming. " We should, ultimately, read such an expansive vision affectively, especially considering the vivid resonances between Marx and Deleuzean-Spinozan affect that I have traced throughout this essay. What is the communal development and becoming of creative potentialities, capacities, and human powers in themselves, if not a Spinozan ethic where "powers, speeds, and slownesses [are] composed" such that "individuals enter into composition with one another in order to form a higher individual, ad in nitum" and "capacities can compound directly to constitute a more 'intense' capacity or power"? The free development of the individual and the community in Marx is in part a development of affect, constantly raising bodies in their individuality and relationality to higher, more intense capacities and power. From the standpoint of Deleuze and Spinoza, affective capacity is in the end never a matter of the disconnected or atomized body for which another poses a limit or constraint, nor of "utilizations or captures, " but "of sociabilities and communities. " The community of a post-capitalist Marxist vision would involve a set of affective relations that reciprocally amplify affective capacity, creating sociabilities that mutually enrich individual and collective powers. An affective reading of Marx alone, however, will be an insuf cient critical resource for such a post-capitalist imaginary. Not all bodies circulate, produce, and interact in the same way within the relations and modes of capitalist affect. Gendered, sexed, sexualized, racialized, colonized bodies experience and are constituted by the affective structures of any mode of production in polyvalent ways. That is, there is not a singular capitalist body, proletariat body, or bourgeois body. If the concept of the "the body" becomes too universalized, too singular, too abstract-temptations that are easy to succumb to in theorizing about affect and embodiment, this article included-it is easy to conceal the ways in which bodies are always already multiply gendered, racialized, sexualized, and so forth. There is no guarantee that certain modes of theorizing affect can or necessarily will interrogate these dynamics. While I believe that the affective reading of Marx is a fundamental part of radical critique and world-building one hundred and fty years after Capital, it can only be one problematic aspect of it. Future work should juxtapose an affective reading of Marx with work from women of color feminists, postcolonial and decolonial theorists, Marxist and socialist feminists, queer theorists, and theorists of racial capitalism, particularly in the ways that affect gures into these projects.
Only such an expansive project could pre gure a present of resistance or a future of affective community. Marx's own overcoat on its way in and out of pawn, in order to puzzle through the way that capitalism is both "the most abstract society that has ever existed" and also "a society that consumes ever more concrete human bodies. " The coat becomes an exemplar of the commodity as "the abstract 'cell-form' of capitalism, " but Stallybrass tracks the material things of Marx and his family in order to insist on these objects as "the materials Berlant discusses the Marxist tradition as "offer[ing] multiple ways to engage the affective aspects of class antagonism, labor practices, and a communally generated class feeling that emerges from inhabiting a zone of lived structure. " We must add Marx himself to the repertoire of this mode of cultural, social, and political theorizing on affect: he is, I
Conclusion: Cultural Theory and the Affective Marx
have argued, a foundational theorist of the affectivity of class, labor, structure, oppression, and feeling under capitalism.
